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THE FEDERAL INTERPLEADER ACT OF 1936: I
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, t
"The ship is in the harbor; the sails are swelling; the east wind blows;
let us weigh the anchor, and put forth tb sea."---SEDENBORG.
I
INTRODUCTION 1
Life insurance companies, surety companies, banks, railroads, ware-
houses, and other kinds of corporations doing business in several states,
are frequently subjected to conflicting claims by two or more persons
growing out of a single obligation previously incurred by the corporation.
The equitable remedy of interpleader has long been useful for dealing
with just such conflicting claims in situations where the claimants all
live in the same state. The stakeholder admits liability and is andous
to pay the person rightfully entitled to payment if it can be ascertained
which of the claimants is that person. Interpleader enables the stake-
holder to put the money or other property in dispute into court, with-
draw from the proceeding, and leave the claimants to litigate between
themselves the ownership of the fund in court. Since the claimants
are now enabled to assert their rights in the interpleader proceeding, an
1 Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. This article is the fourth of a series. Moderniihtg Intcrplkader (1921) 30 Y,=L L. J.
814 discussed the judge-made requisites, such as privity, which have hampered the natural
effectiveness of this remedy. Interstate Interplkder (1924) 33 YUXi L. J. 685 considered
the difficulties of obtaining relief against claims by citizens of different states and touched
briefly on the opportunities for federal interpleader, which have now been realized.
Interpleader in the United States Courts (1932) 41 YL.= L. J. 1134, 42 id. 41, dealt with
federal interpleader both apart from statutes and under the 1926 act, which has been
greatly extended by the act of 1936, to which the present article is devoted. The s-ries
will be concluded by a discussion of the numerous state interpleader statutes.
See also JosEaxa S. CONWELL, THE FntAL rINTrEPLEADE. AcT (1920) and Tim Frtnm
INh mpr2zaDE AcT DowN To DAt (1926), two valuable papers read before the Association
of Life Insurance Counsel and published in pamphlets, which contain information on the
history of the various bills in Congress and discuss the operation of the 1917 and 1925
acts; the 1926 pamphlet contains forms for bills and decrees CMzrz, C-ASES O:. I,.TM-
PLEADER, c. I (1936) is a recent collection of cases and references on interpleader. Several
important decisions under the three earlier Federal Interpleader Acts are discuss:ed in (1933)
17 MN. L. Rzv. 449; (1924) 2 TFN. L. REv. 102; and in the references cited in second
article.
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injunction is issued forbidding the claimants to bring any further pro-
ceedings directly against the stakeholder. The claimants are greatly
benefited by the opportunity to settle their controversy in the inter-
pleader, because the winning claimant can at once obtain the property
in dispute from the court, which has such property in its possession or
control. He is thus much better off than if he had merely obtained a
judgment at law against the stakeholder, for then he would have been
faced with the difficulties of finding assets and levying execution. Thus
interpleader is a remedy which benefits all parties concerned.
In many controversies where interpleader would be desirable, difficul-
ties arise because the claimants reside in different states. This may pre-
vent the life insurance company or other stakeholder from obtaining
interpleader in a state court. For example, if a Pennsylvanian and a
Californian each claimed to be the proper beneficiary of a life insurance
policy, the company could not force the Californian into the Pennsyl-
vania court in order to interplead there with the Pennsylvanian, because
the process of the Pennsylvania courts does not run beyond the limits of
the state. This was definitely established by the Supreme Court in New
York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy2 in 1916. At that time, interpleader
in a United States court was also hard to obtain when the claimants re-
sided in different states, because the process of a federal court normally
does not run outside the state containing the federal district in which
suit is brought.' Without special legislation relating to interpleader, a
United States district court in Pennsylvania could not acquire personal
jurisdiction over the California claimant, so long as he avoided personal
service in Pennsylvania. Consequently, the Dunlevy case left insurance
companies and other similarly situated stakeholders without an adequate
remedy in either state or federal courts.
Insurance companies obtained some relief from this unsatisfactory
situation soon after the Dunlevy case. In 1917, Congress enacted the
first Federal Interpleader Act,4 authorizing these companies to interplead
in a United States district court when the claimants lived in different
states, and providing that the process of the court could run into all parts
of the United States, wherever the various claimants lived. A second
statute in 1925' attempted some improvements, and the third statute,
enacted in 1926,6 made further improvements and extended the benefits
2. 241 U. S. 519 (1916). See Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, supra note 1, at 711.
3. 36 STAT. 1101 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 111-114 (1926); cases cited in Chafee, supra
note 2, at 720-721.
4. 39 STAT. 929 (1917). See Chafee, supra note 1, 41 YALE L. J. at 1161.
5. 43 STAT. 976 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (26) (1926). See Chafee, supra note 4,
at 1162.




of the act to certain other types of stakeholders who badly needed relief,
namely, casualty companies and surety companies. This legislation has
worked admirably. Many suits have been brought under it,7 and the
disputes between the claimants have been settled quickly with apparent
satisfaction to themselves as well as to the insurance companies and
other organizations benefited by the statutes.
Many important businesses vexed by similar claims from residents of
different states still remained outside the scope of this legislation, for
instance, railroads, warehouses, banks (especially savings banks), and
oil companies operating under leases and confronted with disputes as to
the ownership of royalties.' The successful operation of the 1926 Act
7. A list of 25 reported cases under the first three Federal Intepleader Acts until June,
1932, will be found in Chafee, supru note 4 at 1164-1165, nn. 103-106. The citations in
this footnote add 20 subsequent cases until the enactment of the new statute on January
20, 1936, making 45 cases in all. In addition, there are doubtless many unreported district
court cases.
Interpleader granted. 20 cases are listed in Chafee, supra note 4 at 1164, nn. 103
104, and 18 more are listed below, making 37 in all. Later developments of 3 cases on the
previous list were as follows: In Ackerman v. Tobin, 22 F. (2d) 541 C. C. A. 8th, (1927),
ce7tiorari was denied, 276 U. S. 628 (1928). In National Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanders,
38 F. (2d) 212 C. C. A. 5th, 1930, discussed in Chafee, supra note 4 at 1169-1171 and at
the close of this article, the Illinois claimant was awarded, the res. Sanders v. Armour
Fertilizer Works, 292 U. S. 190 (1934), four judges dissenting, affg 63 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A.
5th, 1933), one judge dissenting. In Vogel v. N. Y. Life Insurance Co., 55 F. (2d) 205,
(C. C. A. 5th, 1932), certiorari was'denied, 287 U. S. 604 (1932).
The new cases granting interpleader are: Shields v. Barton, 60 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. 7th,
1932) ; Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Morris, 61 F. (2d) 104 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932) ; United
Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 62 F. (2d) 776 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); Chaffee v. Locomotive
Engrs. Mut. L. & Acc. Ins. Assn. 67 F. (2d) 279 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933); Howells State
Bank v. Novotny, 69 F. (2d) 32 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Spiro State Bank v. Bankers' Nat.
Life Ins. Co., 69 F. (2d) 185 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Solomon v. Benjamin, 75 F. (2d) 564
(C. C. A. 7th, 1935), cert. denied 295 U. S. 749 (1935); Hintz v. Hlintz, 78 F. (2d) 432
(C. C. A. 7th, 1935), statute not cited; Meyer v. Meyer, 79 F. (2d) 5 (C. C. A. Sth,
1935); N. Y. L. Ins. Co. v. ilageman, 80 F. (2d) 446 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), statute not
cited; Deutser v. Marlboro Shirt Co., Inc., 81 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936) aff'g
Union Central L. Ins. Co. v. Deutser, 13 F. Supp. 313 (D. Md. 1935); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 2 F. Supp. 165 (S. D. N. Y. 1931); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Nydes, 2 F
Supp. 381 (W. D. Pa. 1932); American Surety Co. v. Calcasieu Oil Co., 5S F. (2d) 1039,
2 F. Supp. 200, 3 F. Supp. 939 (W. D. La. 1932, 1933) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Htartley,
4 F. Supp. 639 (D."AMd. 1933), statute not cited; Lawrence v. Travelers Ins. Co., 6 F.
Supp. 428 (E. D. Pa. 1934); N.,Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Cross, 7 F. Supp. 130 (S. D. N. Y.
1934); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Corodemus, 7 F. Supp. 349 (D. Mass. 1934), statute not
cited.
Interpleader denied. 4 cases are listed in Chafee, supra note 4 at'1165, n. 106. The only
subsequent case denying relief is Klaber v. Maryland Casualty Co., 69 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A.
8th, 1934), (interested stakeholder), discussed in second article.
Inconclusive cases. One such case is noted in Chafee, supra note 4 at 1165, n. 105. The
only later case of the sort is Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 'v. Grossman, 4 F. Supp. 990
(S. D. N. Y. 1933), (diversity of citizenship insufficiently averred).
8. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Gas Co. v. Ankrom, 83 W. Va. 81 (1918), noted on the merits
in (1920) 5 A. L. R. 1162.
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indicated that the benefits of interpleader in the United States courts
could be justly extended to these other kinds of businesses. Such an
extension is the main purpose of the fourth Interpleader Act, which has
just been passed.
The Interpleader Act of, 19361 removes all previous limits on the kinds
of companies that are permitted to file bills of interpleader. This remedy
is now available to individuals and corporations generally if they are
subjected to claims by residents of two or more states. In addition,
the new act was drawn to eliminate a few other obstacles that restricted
the power of the United States courts to handle conflicting claims satis-
factorily. So far as possible, the phraseology of the 1926 Act was fol-
lowed. The new statute preserves to life insurance companies, casualty
companies, and surety companies all the benefits of the earlier law, and
also contains some provisions to take care of points in life insurance
litigation not covered by the 1926 Act. Finally, the new law was framed
with the intention of protecting the interests of claimants by furnishing
a cheap and speedy method for the settlement of their disputes.
The need for such legislation had received attention in Congress for
several years. In 1931 bills were introduced by Representative Thatcher
of Kentucky and Senator Barkley of Kentucky,10 allowing "any person,
firm, corporation, association, or society" to interplead under specified
conditions. *These pioneer bills contained much of the substance of the
draft that finally became law. In 1933 two bills, identical with each
other and somewhat similar to the 1931 bills, were introduced by Repre-
sentative Knutson of Minnesota and Senator Hebert of Rhode Island,11
and referred to the respective Judiciary Committees. Favorable action
thereon was recommended by the American Bar Association in 1933.12
In February, 1934, the Attorney General sent to the House Judiciary
Committee an office memorandum approving the Hebert-Knutson bill
subject to some suggested changes.13
In the spring of 1934 the Section on Insurance Law of the American
Bar Association' 4 became actively interested in the enactment of the
9. Public No. 422, 74th Cong. 2nd sess. (1936). ,
10. 72d Congress, H. R. 16335 introduced Jan. 19, 1931, 74 CoNG. REC. '2628 (1931);
S. 2216 introduced Dec. 17, 1931, 75 CONG. RIc. 670 (1931).
11. 73d Congress, H. R. 2852 introduced Mar. 10, 1933, 77 CoNG. Rac. 173 (1933);
S. 1538 introduced on Apr. 17 (calendar day, Apr. 26), 1933, 77 CoNo. REC. 2370 (1933).
This Hebert-Knutson bill is reprinted in Appendix B to the three memoranda cited infra
note 16.
12. (1933) 58 A. B. A. REP. 195-6. The bill was also recommended by the Standing
Committee on Insurance Law, id. at 368, Arthur T. Vande~bilt of Newark, chairman, and
described by Senator Hebert during his address to the Association, id. at 586-7.
13. This memorandum is reprinted in Appendix C to the three memoranda cited infra
note 16.
14. This section, with Mr. Vanderbilt as chairman, had replaced the standing committee,
[Vol. 49
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Hebert-Knutson bill with some modifications. Its special committee on
interpleader legislation,"; in collaboration with Senator Hebert, framed
a draft bill with an explanatory memorandum."0 In June, 1934, Senator
Hebert reported his bill, out from the Committee on the Judiciary, with
an amendment producing in effect a substitute bill conforming to the
draft; and submitted an accompanying report recommending passage.'7
The session ended shortly afterwards without further action on the bill.
In the 74th Congress the measure eventually became law.'5 Bills in
identical form were introduced by Representatives Knutson of Minnesota
and Senator Barkley of Kentucky.0 Upon the recommendation of
Senator Barkley, his bill was amended so as to conform to the substitute
bill reported out by Senator Hebert in 1933, and the latter's report was
resubmitted. On May 1, 1935, after hearing a concise statement by
Senator Barkley of the purposes of his bill, the Senate adopted the
amendment and passed the bill.20  The bill as it came from the Senate
was recommended by the House Judiciary Committee with a few techni-
cal variations," and in this form it passed the House on January 6,
supra note 12. Frank C. Haymond of Fairmont, W. Va., was chairman in 1934-5, and W.
h. Stanley of Wichita in 1935-6.
15. Judge Arthur G. Powell of Atlanta was chairman throughout. For other members,
see (1933) 58 A. B. A. REP. 25; (1934) 59 id. 34; (1935) 60 id. 36. Lawyers participating
actively in either the preparation of the draft or its presentation to members of Congres
included Judge Powell, A. T. Vanderbilt, W. E. Stanley, Washington Bowie, Jr. of Baltimore,
J. H. McChord of Louisville, J. S. Conwell of Philadelphia, H. S. Weaver of New York,
J. L. Barton of Omaha, Professor J. M. Landis, and Professor E. Mi. Morgan.
16. Three successive stages of the draft and memorandum 'were printed. (1) Federal
Interpleader Bill: Draft and Memorandum. Prepared by Z. Chafee, Jr., for the Section of
Insurance Law of'the American Bar Asn. May, 1934. (2) [Same title.] Revised May 11,
1934. (3) [Same title.] (1934) Am. Bar Assn. Section of Insurance Law, Program and
Committee Reports, 63-100. Copies of these three documents are in the Yale and Harvard
Law Libraries. All material of permanent value therein is in the present article.
This draft.was informally approved by the Section of Insurance Law at its Washington
meeting, May 11, 1934, and formally at the annual meeting in Milaukee, Aug. 30, 1934.
See (1934) 50 A. B. A. RFP. 205, 652.
17. 73d Congress, 2d Session, June 6 (calendar day, June 13), 1934, Senate Calendar
No. 1517, S. 1538 [Report No. 1417]; and Report No. 1417, Federal Inlerpeader Bill,
Report [To accompany S. 1538].
18. The substitute bill received the approval of the committee on federal legislation of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Assoclation of Life Insurance
Presidents, and the International Association of Insurance Counsel. As the measure was
of a technical and non-controversial nature, it did not give rise to public hearings or debate
on the floor of either house, but many Senators and Representatives took an active intelest
in its passage, particularly Mr. Barkley and Mr. Knutson.
19. 74th Congress, H. R. 2025 introduced Jan. 3, 1935, 79 Co;o. R . 51 (1935); S.
1277 introduced Jan. 21, 1935, 79 Co.zr,. Rl. 654 (1935). These bills corresponded to the
Hebert-Knutson bills of 1933, supra n. 11. See Senate Report No. 558 (Apr. i, 1935).
20. 79 ConG. REe. 6711 (1935).
21. 79 CoNG. RZe. 10811 (1935). The bill became House Calendar No. 173, and Con-
sent Calendar No. 362.
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1936.22 The Senate concurred in the House amendments on January
16,23 and the bill was signed by President Roosevelt on January 20,
1936.24
TEXT OF THE ACT OF 1936
The title of the new statute is "An Act to Amend Section 24 of the
Judicial Code25 by Conferring on District Courts Additional Jurisdiction
of Bills of Interpleader and of Bills in the Nature of Interpleader."
After the amending clause, the act reads as printed in the accompany-
ing footnote, 6 changes from the Act of 1926 being indicated by italics.
22. 80 CONG. REc., Jan. 6, 1936, at 81.
23. 80 CONG. REc., Jan. 16, 1936 at 464. Examined and signed by President of Senate
pro tern. and Speaker, id., and id. at 574 (Jan. 17). Sent to President, id. at 648 (Jan. 18).
24. 80 CONG. Rac., Jan. 22, 1936, at 790.
25. 28 U. S. C. A. § 41.
26. That section 24 of the Judicial Code, as amended, is amended by inserting at the end
thereof the following:
[The district courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows:]
(26) "Original jurisdiction of bill of interpleader and of bills in the nature of interpleader-
Twenty-sixth. (a) Of suits in equity begun by bills of interpleader or bills in the nature
of bills of interpleader duly verified, filed by any person, firm, corporation, association, or
society having in his or its custody or possession money or property of the value of $500
or more, or having issued a note, bond, certificate, policy of insurance, or other instrument
of the value or amount of $500 or more, or providing for the deliveyy or payment or the
loan of money or property of such amount or value, or being under any obligation written
or unwritten to the amount of $500 or more, ff-
"(i) Two or more adverse claimants, citizens of different States, are claiming to be
entitled to such money or property, or to any one or more of the benefits arising by virtte
of any note, bond, certificate, policy, or other instrument, or arising by virtue of any such
obligation; and
"(ii) The complainant (a) has deposited such money or property or has paid the amount
of or the loan or other value of such instrument or the amount due under such obligalio'h
into the registry of the court, there to abide the judgment of the court; or (b) has
given bond payable to the clerk of the court in such amount and with suck surety as the
court or judge may deem proper, conditioned upon the compliance-by the complainant
with the future order or decree of the court with respect to the'subject 'matter of the con-
troversy. Such a: suit in equity may be entertained although the titles or claims of the
conflicting claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical, but arc adverse
to and independent of one another.
"b. Such a suit may be brought in the district court of the district in which one or more
of such claimants resides or reside.
"c. Notwithstanding any provision of the Judicial Code to the contrary, said court shall
have power to issue its process for all such claimants and to issue an order of injunction
against each of them, enjoining them from instituting- o prosecuting any suit or proceeding
in any State court or in any United States court on account of such money or' property or
on such instrument or obligation until the further order of the court; which process and
order of injunction shall be returnable at such time as the said court or a judge thereof
shall determine and shall be addressed to and served by the United States marshals for the
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SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL POINTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE
NEW STATUTE AND THE 1926 ACT
1. The persons who can interplead are not limited to insurance,
casualty, and surety companies.
2. Bills in the nature of interpleader are included.
3. The prerequisites of interpleader are stated as facts to be proved
and not as averments in the bill.
4. The subject-matter in controversy is broadly defined to correspond
with the extension of the persons who can interplead.
5. Provisions are made for controversies over various benefits of
life insurance policies, such as loans, surrender value, etc.
6. The stakeholder may either deposit the fund in court or file a
bond.
7. Privity is expressly abolished.
8. The venue provision is shortened to conform to judicial interpre-
tation of the 1926 Act.
9. Interpleader is allowed defensively in actions at law.
II
This article proposes to take up in the order of their appearance in
the statute the clauses which require explanation, either as to the reasons
for their insertion or as to the purposes which the language was meant to
respective districts wherein said claimants reside or may be found.
"d. Said court shall hear and determine the cause and shall discharge the complainant
from further liability; and shall make the injunction permanent and enter all such other
orders and decrees as may be necessary or'convenient to carry out and enforce the same.
"e. In any action at law in a United States District Court against any person, firm, corpora-
tion, association, or society, such defendant way set'up by way of equitble defense, ir ac-
cordance with section 274b of the Judicial Code (U.S.C. title 28, sec. 398), any matter
which would entitle suc person, firn, corporation, association, or society to file a. original
or ancillary bill of interpleader or bill in the nature of interpeader ir the same court or in
any other United States District Court against the plaintiff in such action at law and ore
or more other adverse claimants, under the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection
or any other provision of the Judicial Code and the rules of court made pursuant thereto.
The defendant may join as parties to suck equitable defense any clainant or dcahnants who
are not already parties of such action at law. The district court i: which such equitable
defense is interposed shall thereby possess the powers conferred upon district courts by
paragraphs (c) and (d) of this subsection and by section 274b of the Judicial Code.
SEC. 2. The Act entitled, "An Act authorizing casualty companies, surety companics insur-
ance companies or associations or fraternal or beneficial societies to file bills of inter-
pleader," approved May 8, 1926 [U.S.C., Supp. III, title 28, sec. 41 (26)] is hereby re-
pealed. Said repeal shall not: affect any act done or any right, accruing or accrued in any
suit or proceeding had or commenced under said Act hereby repealed, prior to the paszage
of this Act, but all such acts or rights, suits or proceedixts shall continue and be valid and




accomplish. The various points of difference from the previous statute,
listed above, will thus be reviewed, except as to the first point which
needs no discussion beyond what has already been said.
BILLS IN THE NATURE OF BILLS OF INTERPLEADER
A bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader describes a suit filed by a
stakeholder who has some special ground for equitable relief besides the
double vexation. For instance, he is a trustee or wants cancellation of
an instrument for fraud. On the other hand, double vexation is the only
reason for equitable jurisdiction over a bill of interpleader (often called
a strict bill) and the substantive questions at issue are nearly always
legal. The practical difference between the two types of bills is that
the long-established equitable principles limiting strict bills are con-
siderably relaxed in cases of bills in the nature of bills of interpeader.2
Federal jurisdiction over such proceedings may be very valuable for the
just settlement of many controversies, especially where surety companies
are involved. For example, a surety compary writes a non-statutory
bond covering a building contractor, and it is doubtful whether it runs
to the benefit of materialmen as well as of the landowner, who is a
citizen of a different state from the materialmen. The company may
have certain defenses if the bond be construed one way and not if it be
construed the other. The amount of the bond is insufficient to cover the
materialmen and the landowner in full, so that the surety company
wishes to pay the total amount of the bond into court and interplead
these various claimants. A strict bill of interpleader might be denied
in many courts in this case, because the above-mentioned situation as to
defenses gives the surety company some interest in the outcome of the
dispute. Such interest would not bar a bill in the nature of a bill of
interpleader, and the great multiplicity of parties would furnish the
needed special equitable ground for such a bill. In such a case federal
jurisdiction and the unlimited area for service of process will enable the
surety company to interplead and ,determine its just liabilities. It is
easy to imagine other cases where federal jurisdiction over bills in the
nature of interpleader is desirable, for example, the case of a casualty
company with a limited liability, discussed in the second half of this
article. Another reason for jurisdiction is that the distinction between
these bills and strict bills of interpleader is not always clear, so that the
simplest plan is to allow the United States district courts to handle both
types without being obliged to draw fine distinctions between them for
jurisdictional purposes.
The 1917, 1925, and 1926 Acts mentioned only bills of interpleader,
27. CHAFEE, CASES ON EQu.rABLE RExtms, 75 (1936); Chafee, Modernizing InAter-
pleader (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 839.
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and all the reported cases where relief was given under those acts involved
strict bills. Perhaps their language was sufficiently broad to cover bills
in the nature of bills of interpleader, but two cases under the 1926 Act
took the view that such bills were not within its provisions.P There-
fore, these bills have been expressly included in the 1936 statute.
METHOD OF STATING PREREQUISITES FOR RELIEF
The Act of 1926, like the preceding statutes, stated the prerequisites for
relief as rules of pleading. The stakeholder must aver that certain facts
exist. The new statute, however, requires substantially the same facts
to be proved and not merely averred. The Act of 1926 would doubtless
have been judically interpreted to mean what the new act e.pressly
says; if all the specified averments were made in a bill and then found
to be false at the hearing, interpleader would have been denied. The
change is only formal, but it has the advantage of directness.
THE DISPUTED SUBJECT MATTER
This portion of the statute describes the situation in which interpleader
will be necessary and the types of subject matter which are claimed by
two or more persons. The Act contemplates three kinds of disputed
subject matter (res):
1. The phrase "money or property of the value of $500 or more"
takes care of the situation where the res is money, a chattel, or land;
this was in the 1926 Act.
2. The situation where the :res is an instrument is covered by the
words "having issued a note, bond, certificate, policy of insurance, or
other instrument of the value or amount of $500 or more, or providing
for the delivery or payment or the loan of money or property of such
amount or value." Under the 1926 Act, the only instruments recognized
were a bond, a policy of insurance, and a certificate of membership in
a fraternal society. This limitation was entirely proper when the only
persons allowed to interplead were insurance, casualty, and surety
companies, and beneficial societies. Now, however, any person subject
to conflicting claims by residents of different states is entitled to inter-
plead, and the range of instruments will be correspondingly very much
wider.
3. The words "being under any obligation written or unwritten to
the amount of $500 or more" take care of other obligations which are
not embodied in a formal promise to pay money, like a life insurance
policy, a bond, or a note. This third type will take care of claims
arising out of building contracts between contractors and subcontractors.
23. Pacific AMut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lusk, 46 F. (2d) 505 (W. D. La. 1930); Klaher v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 69 F. (2d) 934, 939-941 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
1936]
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It will also take care of unwritten obligations such as debts. The word
"obligation" seems broad enough to include tort obligations where the
stakeholder is only a technical tortfeasor and so will not be barred from
relief on the ground that the controversy is due to his own wrongdoing.
An example of such tort claims is this: An automobile has been left in
a garage by A. It is claimed by A and also by X, who says that it was
obtained from him by fraud or theft. The garage, confronted with these
conflicting claims, does not know to whom it should deliver the auto-
mobile. Both A and X bring actions of conversion against the garage
for the value of the automobile. A and X reside in different states. The
obligation of the garage is not represented by a written instrument and
yet interpleader is badly needed. Under the Act of 1936 it could be
obtained.
The jurisdictional amount is made $500 as in the 1926 statute. This
is much lower than the jurisdictional amount of $3000 required in other
federal suits based on diversity of citizenship.20 Justice demands such
a differentiation. The ordinary plaintiff whose controversy concerning
$1000 is too small to support a federal suit can bring an action in a
state court, but a stakeholder subjected to conflicting claims of $1000
asserted by citizens of different states must e;ther be allowed to inter-
plead in a United States court or be denied interpleader altogether.
Unlike the ordinary plaintiff, the stakeholder cannot be helped by a
state court because of its powerlessness to compel the appearance of
claimants residing in different states. Consequently, it is desirable to
keep the jurisdictional amount for federal interpleader low.80
Loans. Practically all life insurance policies are now required by statute
to contain provisions under which the insurance company agrees to
make loans on the security of the policy. Disputes have often arisen
between persons claiming to be entitled to borrow under the policy. It
is admitted that a loan can be made, but more than one person may
maintain that by the terms of the policy he is entitled to the full amount
of the loan. The 1926 Act looked to the payment of a single sum due
on the maturity of the policy. In order to make it clear that the moneys
available under a loan may be the subject of interpleader, the words
"or the loan" have been inserted. They may have application also to
claims of a similar nature arising under instruments other than insur-
ance policies.
Corresponding references to loans have been inserted in the deposit
provision in clause (ii).
29. 18 STAT. 470 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1) '(1926).
30. For the only case under the previous statutes which involved a question of jurisdic-




The act of 1936, like the previous statutes, authorizes interpleader
when there are "two or more adverse claimants, citizens of different
States." Some important questions of federal jurisdiction arise under
this legislation whenever there is partial cocitizenship.0 '
Cocitizenship between the stakeholder and one claimant. It will happen
quite often that one claimant is a cocitizen of the stakeholder. For
example, a New York life insurance company is sued by a New Yorker
and a Pennsylvanian, each of whom claims to be the proper beneficiary
under the policy. The language of Congress seems sufficiently flexible
to authorize interpleader in this situation, since the act refers spe-
fically to diversity among the claimants. The only remaining question
is whether Congress can constitutionally confer jurisdiction upon the
courts in spite of the partial cocitizenship. Article MI, section 2, of
the Constitution says that the federal judicial power shall extend to
"Controversies . . . . between Citizens of different States." It is a
fairly safe conclusion that this clause does not prevent federal inter-
pleader in a case like that described above, since the necessary diversity
of citizenship is supplied by the main dispute between the New Yorker
and the Pennsylvanian.
The Supreme Court has never held that the constitutional grant of
power to the federal courts is not broad enough to include a case in
which one codefendant is of diverse citizenship from the plaintiff and
the other is not. In many cases not involving interpleader, the court
has decided that, however broad the possible jurisdiction given by the
Constitution, actual jurisdiction did not extend beyond the congressional
grant in the statutes regulating federal courts; and that the statutes then
applicable to federal suits required that every indispensable party on
one side of the controversy should be of diverse citizenship from every
party on an opposite side. But it is important to notice that the Supreme
Court drew this requirement of complete diversity of citizenship from
the legislation then in force and not from the Constitution. It merely
held that Congress had not as yet permitted federal suits where there
was partial cocitizenship. It did not hold that Congress could not con-
stitutionally permit such suits if it wished. 3V 2
The argument can fairly be made that since these decisions the var-
ious Interpleader Acts have done just what Congress seems able to do
within its constitutional powers, and have removed the bar of partial
31. For a more extended discussion of these problems, see Chafee, supra note 4 at
1141-1143, 1165-1169.
32. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (U. S. 1806); Sewing Machine Cases, 18




cocitizenship from interpleader, although the bar remains for federal
litigation in general. There are sound reasons of policy for such a
distinction. If federal jurisdiction be denied in an ordinary case of
partial cocitizenship, the controversy can be adequately handled in the
state courts. But interpleader against residents of different states is
usually impossible in the state courts, and this is just as true when the
stakeholder and one claimant are cocitizens. If the stakeholder cannot
interplead in the United States courts, he cannot interplead at all. Hence
those courts should not prevent relief under the 1936 Act by imposing
a requirement of complete diversity of citizenship which is not expressly
stated in either the statute or the Constitution. Furthermore, the citizen-
ship of the stakeholder is not practically important when the real con-
troversy is that between the claimants, which is fought out in the second
stage of the interpleader after, the stakeholder has dropped out.
The judicial authority, so far as it goes, is in favor of relief under the
Interpleader Acts in such a situation. 3 '
Cocitizenship among claimants. Must there be complete diversity of
citizenship among the claimants? If there are only two claimants, they
must, of course, be citizens of different states in order to bring an
original bill of interpleader within the terms of the statute3 4  However,
it occasionally happens that three or more persons make claims and
that some of these claimants are cocitizens. If the cocitizens have ex-
actly the same interest, no real difficulty arises, for instance, when in-
surance money is claimed by the widow living in one, state and by two
children of a dead first wife living in another state. Under such cir-
cumstances the non-antagonistic cocitizen claimants may be considered
aligned together on one side of the controversy in opposition to the
claimant who lives in another state. This position is supported by sev-
eral cases." The real problem arises when the cocitizen claimants are
antagonistic to each other. For example, life insurance money is claimed
by each of three successive assignees, two of whom live in the same
state. Since the state courts of that state cannot force the non-resident
third claimant to come in, the insurance company badly needs to inter.
33. See Ackerman v. Tobin, 22 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Allen v. Hudson, 35 F,
(2d) 330 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lott, 275 Fed. 365, 372 (D. Cal.
1921). For non-statutory cases see Von Herberg v. Seattle, 27 F. (2d) 457 (C. C. A. 9th,
1928); (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 854; Chafee supra note 4 at 1141-2. The office memorandum
from the Attorney General, supra note 13, also takes the view that the stakeholder may be a
cocitizen of one claimant.
34. However, it may be possible to interplead under a nonstatutory ancillary bill or
under an equitable defense within the terms of paragraph (e) of the 1936 Act. See infra,
p. 989.
35. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lott, 275 Fed. 365, 372 (D. Cal. 1921), semble'; New York
L. Ins. Co. v. Bidoggia, 15 F. (2d) 126, 17 F. (2d) 112 (D. Idaho 1926); Mutual L. Ins,
Co. v. Bondurant, 27 F. (2d) 464 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928), cert. denied 278 U. S. 630 (1928).
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plead in the United States courts in such a situation, but it does seem
doubtful whether the necessary diversity of citizenship exists. Here
there is a real controversy between the two co-citizen assignees. The 1936
Act may mean that each claimant must reside in a separate state, no
matter how numerous the claimants. On the other hand, jurisdiction
exists if the statute can be construed to require only that two adverse
claimants must be citizens of different States.30 Such an interpretation
conforms to the general purpose of the 1936 act, that the United States
courts should be given power to settle all interpleader cases that cannot
be handled by the state courts. This view is supported by five cases37
under the 1917 and 1926 Acts, which granted interpleader where some
antagonistic claimants were apparently co-citizens. The liberal attitude
adopted by the courts in giving relief under former Interpleader Acts
may be adopted as well toward the Act of 1936.
The new statute made no special attempt to meet these two problems
of partial cocitizenship in strict bills of interpleader, but simply used the
same words as the jurisdictional clause of the 1926 Act,"9 since both
stakeholders and claimants seemed to be entirely satisfied with that
clause, under which partial cocitizenship has created no serious ob-
stacles to strict interpleader.
Special diversity problems created by bills in the nature of bills of
interpleader. Such bills, which are authorized by the new statute, may
present somewhat greater difficulties if cocitizenship exists between the
stakeholder and one claimant. In bills in the nature of interpleader
the stakeholder sometimes disputes the extent of his liability to the
claimants, 9 and in the supposed case his particular controversy would
36. The question whether the statute, when so construed, is constitutional in view of the
want of complete diversity of citizenship resembles the constitutional problem created by
partial cocitizenship between the stakeholder and one claimant. This has already been
considered, supra p. 973.
37. Lowther v. New York Life Ins. Co., 278 Fed. 405 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922); Ackerman v.
Tobin, 22 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Ross v. International Life Insurance Co., 24 F.
(2d) 345 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Reid, 16 F. (2d) S02 (E. D. Pa.
1926); Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Brown, 52 F. (2d) 164 (W. D. La. 1931). See
Chafee, supra note 4 at 1169, n. 120, for comment on these cases. The point was left
open in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lott, 275 Fed. 365 (D. Cal. 1921). For non-statutory
cases, see Chafee, supra note 4 at 1142-3; Turman Oil Co. v. Lathrop, S F. Supp. 870
(N. D. Okla. 1934); Note (1935) 48 HAnv. L. RLT. 854. The office memorandum from
the Attorney General, supra note 13, also supports the existence of jurisdiction.
38. The office memorandum from the Attorney General, supra note 13, proposed an
amendment which would permit cocitizenship among all the claimants so long as the
stakeholder resided in a different state. For the reasons given in the text, it seemed better
to adhere to the language of the 1926 Act, and not include bills of interpleader which could
be filed in a state court.
39. For an example of such a bill in a state court where all the parties were cocitizens
of the state, see Aleck v. Jackson, 49 N. J. Eq. 507 (Ch., 1S92). The court first determined
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not be between citizens of different states. Still, the main controversy
between the claimants would be between citizens of different states and
in itself a proper subject of federal jurisdiction. This fact might be
enough to bring the whole case into the United States courts. In other
words, the stakeholder's subsidiary dispute might be saved by the doc-
trines concerning separable controversies and ancillary suits.40  It might
be argued that, if it be constitutional for a United States district court
to take jurisdiction of a strict interpleader bill where one of the claim-
ants is a cocitizen with the stakeholder and the other is not, on the
ground that the case involves a controversy between two parties (the
claimants) who are of diverse citizenship, jurisdiction of a bill in the
nature of a bill of interpleader would exist on the same ground, although,
as a preliminary to the final determination of the controversy between
the parties of diverse citizenship (the claimants), it is also necessary for
the court to determine the stakeholder's own controversy which is not
free from cocitizenship.41 However, even if this argument is unsound
and the cocitizenship between the stakeholder and one claimant would
defeat the bill, it was felt that the situation was too infrequent to im-
pair the chief purposes of the new legislation. The insertion of special
language to take care of it was therefore deemed inadvisable.
The other kind of partial cocitizenship, that among the claimants, is
less troublesome in situations where equitable principles would support
the bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader. Since the stakeholder has
by hypothesis an independent ground for getting into equity besides
double vexation, he can usually file an original bill on that independent
ground against such claimants as are not cocitizens of each other, and
later file an ancillary bill against the claimants who are cocitizens of the
previous defendants. Similar ancillary proceedings in the nature of
interpleader have been allowed without legislation,42 and the new statute
seems to facilitate the use of this ancillary procedure.
Residents of the District of Columbia and the territories. An insur-
ance company or other stakeholder sometimes needs interpleader if one
the extent of the stakeholder's liability, and then heard the contest between the claimants
over the amount so fixed.
40. As to such suits, see Chafee, supra note 4 at 1145-1160.
41. See Sutton v. English, 246 U. S. 199, 204 (1918), an original bill (not interpleader)
filed by non-residents of Texas against residents, in which one defendant whose interest
was altogether adverse to the plaintiffs in a substantial controversy was held to be properly
aligned for jurisdictional purposes as a defendant, although as to other issues she had the
same interest as the plaintiffs. Jurisdiction in that case was denied, however, on another
ground not material here. See DoBar, FEDERAr. JuRisDicriox, 211-212 (1927) 40 HAtV. L,
REV. 1015.
42. Sherman Nat. Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 247 Fed. 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917);
Fleming v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 40 F. (2d) 38 (C. C. A. Sth, 1930), cert. denied, 282
U. S. 869 (1930).
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claimant lives in the District of Columbia (or a territory) and the other
claimant lives in one of the states. Unfortunately, it seems impossible
to confer federal jurisdiction in such a situation. Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Lott,43 under the 1917 Act, held that a resident of the District
of Columbia was not a citizen of a state and so could not be interpleaded
under the existing legislation. This obstacle is not only statutory; it is
constitutional, and therefore nothing could be done in the new statute to
take care of it.44
CLAIMS TO THE BENEFITS OF AN INSTRUMENT OR OBLIGATION
This provision for claims "to any one or more of the benefits arising
by virtue of any note, bond, certificate, policy, or other instrument, or
arising by virtue of any such obligation" was inserted primarily to take
care of certain disputes relating to life insurance policies. The claimants
may be claiming, not the amount of "money" promised by such a policy
on death or maturity, but some other benefit of the policy offered by its
terms or by law. For example, they may both be seeking a loan or the
cash surrender value of the policy, or to have the amount thereof paid by
monthly installments over a long period of years. It may even happen
that one claimant is demanding a different benefit from the other. Thus
one may be seeking the surrender value while the other wishes to con-
tinue the insurance in full force. The phrase "to any one or more of the
benefits" was inserted instead of "to the benefits" as originally drafted,
because it was not perfectly clear whether the plural alone would cover
a'case, except by construction, where the right to ody one "benefit"
under a policy was being contested.
DEPOSIT OR BOND
Paragraph (a) of the 1936 Act describes successively the persons who
can file bills of interpleader, the subject matter in dispute, and the
claimants; and then proceeds to state the requirement of deposit of the
res in court. The deposit clause departs from the previous statute in
some respects. First, where the 1926 Act said "has paid the amount of
such bond or policy", the recent statute says "the amount of .... such
instrument or the amount of such obligation" in order to take care of the
new types of stakeholders allowed to interplead and the new types of
subject-matter. Secondly, "or the loan or other value" is inserted to
take care of life insurance cases where adverse claimants are seeking
43. 275 Fed. 365 (D. Cal. 1921).
44. If the state claimant brings a federal law suit against the stakeholder, the latter
might be able to bring in the district or territorial claimant by an ancillary proceeding.
See supra note 34.
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to borrow on the policy, or to obtain its cash surrender value or some
other benefit other than the payment of the full face of the policy.
Finally, the 1936 statute allows the stake holder, as an alternative to
a deposit of the res, to file a surety bond approved by the court. 46 Al-
though the disputed subject matter will ordinarily be deposited in court,
situations sometimes arise where the rigid requirement of a deposit
would prevent just relief. For example, it is obvious that a deposit is
impracticable when one claimant to the benefits of life insurance demands
one disposition (or option) under the policy and the other claimant
demands a very different disposition (or option). To illustrate, if
claimant A demands the cash surrender value of the policy and claimant
B demands the continuance of the insurance with the cash surrender
value left intact, the requirement to deposit the thing in dispute cannot
readily be complied with. Yet it would be harsh to deny interpleader
under such circumstances. A bond in such a case will protect the
claimants. Also the deposit of the fund in court involves a deduction for
the clerk's commission (sometimes called poundage) and there will be no
such deduction in the case of a bond. Moreover, the bond will entitle
the winning claimant to interest. Of course the court should be very
careful to insist on an adequate surety.
OMISSION OF ANY REQUIREMENT OF WANT OF INTERtST
Want of interest in the stakeholder is often required by state inter-
pleader statutes, and the bills introduced in 1931 by Senator Barkley
and Representative Thatcher specify as a condition of relief: "Com-
plainant does not have or claim any interest in the thing or fund which is
the subject matter of the controversy." On the other hand, nothing of
the sort appears in the 1926 Act and its predecessors, or in the Hebert-
Knutson bill. The draftsman of the 1936 Act considered a clause on
this point to be both unnecessary and undesirable.
It is unnecessary because equity judges have long regarded any sub-
stantial interest in the controversy as a bar to strict interpleader; and
the United States courts in construing the federal interpleader legislation
45. The provision allowing a bond is taken from the Hebert-Knutson bill, supra note 11.
Mr. Conwell says, in THE FEDaAL INTEPLDER Acr DoWNi To DATE, op. cit. supra note I
at 479, that an attempt was made to relax the deposit requirement when the act of 1926
was drafted, "but the Judiciary Committee was not willing to be convinced of the good
intention of the companies, and insisted that the money or the proceeds of the policy be
deposited at the time of the filing of the bill." Because of the express deposit requirements
of the 1917 and 1926 Acts, failure to deposit the res prevented interpleader in several caseg.
Chafee, supra note 1, 42 YALn L. J. at 55, n. 58. However, in federal cases not under
the Interpleader Acts, it has been held sufficient to offer to hold the res at the disposition
of the court, and failure to do even this is sometimes excused, especially in bills in the
nature of interpleader. Chafee, id. at 55, n. 59.
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have repeatedly said that the relief authorized by the statute must con-
form to the recognized equitable principles of interpleader. 0 The main
effect of this legislation has been to extend the jurisdiction of the United
States courts to grant interpleader, but the nature of the remedy has
remained as it was administered in equity before the statutes. In ac-
cordance with this view, serious interest has been held a bar to relief
under the 1926 Act.' The courts will doubtless continue this rule,
though the Act says nothing about want of interest.
The insertion of a clause requiring want of interest would also be
undesirable. Several state courts have interpreted such a provision in
state legislation very rigidly so as to make the slightest interest fatal
to bills of interpleader; and if the federal statute should expressly pro-
hibit the stakeholder's interest, there is danger that some United States
courts will begin running down these state cases and will follow them. A
more satisfactory view of bills of interpleader is that the stakeholder's
interest should not be an absolute bar to relief, but should be only a
factor going to the discretion of the court in the exercise of its jurisdic-
tion. Some state courts have already adopted this view. For example,
a small amount of interest on the part of the stakeholder will not prevent
those courts from granting interpleader, although it may lead them to
deny him the incidental privilege of having his costs and counsel fees
paid out of the fund.4" The danger of rigidity is particularly strong
where the stakeholder's interest arises from a small charge for freight,
warehouse storage, commissions, etc. Such a situation would arise if
merchandise shipped by rail were claimed by two persons, and the
railroad asserted its right to be paid freight charges. Another illustration
arises in life insurance cases where the company asserts its right to de-
duct an unpaid premium from the disputed insurance money. The
liberality which the United States courts have usually shown toward in-
terpleader is indicated by a decision (before the Interpleader Acts) in
this life insurance situation allowing the insurance company to deduct
the unpaid premium and interplead the claimants as to the balance.42
Consequently, any requirement of want of interest has been left out of
46. See for example, Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bondurant, 27 F. (2d) 464 (C. C. A. 6th,
1928); National Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 38 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. Sth, 1930), quoted by
McReynolds, J., in Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Co. 292 U. S. 190, 200 (1934); Klaber v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 69 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
47. Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Co., 292 U. S. 190 (1934), semble; Pacific Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Lusk, 46 F. (2d) 505 (W. D. La. 1930); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.
v. Yaw, 53 F. (2d) 684 (W. D. N. Y. 1931); Klaber v. Maryland Casualty Co., 69 F.
(2d) 934 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934). See Chafee, supra note 45 at 59.
48. CHAa, CASES Ox EQu_,nABLE REmmms, 31-32 (1936); Chafee, supra note 1, 30
YA=E L. J. at 840-842. See infra note 80.
49. McNamara v. Provident Savings Life Ins. Society, 114 Fed. 910 (C. C. A. 5th,
1902), aff'g. 115 Fed. 357 (C. C. E. D. La. 1901).
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the 1936' act, with the hope that the United States courts will continue
to follow this liberal view that interest goes only to the discretion of the
court.
Besides these general objections, a clause making the stakeholder's in-
terest a bar to relief would fit in badly with two new features of the
statute. First, it might hamper the court in settling some of the disputes
over life insurance benefits, previously described. For example, if a
life insurance company has agreed to hold the proceeds of the policy in
trust for the beneficiary and to pay him monthly installments, and a
dispute arises as to who is beneficiary, the company would be technically
unable to allege that it had no interest whatever in the fund. Another
example is a controversy over the loan value of a policy. Because the
money is advanced by the insurance company and repayment of the
loan with interest is contemplated, the company might have some diffi-
culty in satisfying the court that it was complying with a clause requiring
want of interest. The actual wording of the statute, however, leaves
the court free to apply general equitable principles, which do not bar
relief in such situations. Secondly, the 1936 Act authorizes bills in the
nature of bills of interpleader, where courts of equity have always held
that a very substantial interest of the stakeholder does not prevent relief.
The flexible procedure in such bills permits him to dispute the amount
of his liability, which can be settled before the second stage begins be-
tween the claimants; and he may even claim a large lien upon the fund
in controversy or otherwise participate in the second stage. 0 An inter-
est clause in the statute would, of course, be wholly inconsistent with
the above-mentioned equitable principles governing such bills.
ABOLITION OF PRIVITY AND IDENTITY
State courts have frequently, because of an artificial requirement of
privity among the claimants, denied interpleader in situations where in
justice it ought to be granted.5 For example, a warehouseman has been
denied interpleader against the bailor and a claimant under a paramount
title. The unfortunate results of this doctrine have been frequently
recognized by text-writers, and in several cases courts have refused to
apply the doctrine. The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, section 17,
and the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, section 20, were drafted in a
manner to prevent the application of this technical doctrine. The Uni-
50. Levinson v. United States, 258 U. S. 198 (1922) ; Provident Savings Life Ass. Soc. v.
Loeb, 115 Fed. 357 (C. C. E. D. La. 1901); Hayward v. McDonald, 192 Fed. 890 (C. C. A.
5th, 1912); Sherman Nat. Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 247 Fed. 256 (C. C. A. 2d,
1917); Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 56 F. (2d) 385 (S. D. N. Y. 1932),
aff'd in 58 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). None of these suits was under the Inter-
pleader Acts.
51. Chafee, op. cit. supra note 48 at 40-63; Chafee, supra note 1, 30 Y=Iz L. 3. 828-840.
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form Warehouse Receipts Act has been interpreted by the courts not to
require privity. - The corresponding provision of the Uniform Bills
of Lading Act, which has been enacted by Congress,13 has not received
judicial construction on this question. Fortunately the United States
courts thus far have been fairly free from this narrow doctrine of
privity. 4 In a recent case (not under the Interpleader Acts) Judge
Mack said: 5
"I do not deem the kind of 'privity' originally held essential to an inter-
pleader or to a bill in the nature of interpleader, to be required for the
maintenance of such a bill. That one is subject to two or more judgments
and thus to double or greater liability, if and when but one obligation has
been entered into, suffices. Likewise, in absence of an estoppel or of
independent obligations entered into in respect of property, conflicting
claims to the same piece of property, each of which might be sustained
when in justice the possessor should be subject to but one claim, justifies
such a bill."
In spite of this liberality in the United States courts, it was felt that
there was danger, when federal interpleader suits became more numerous
because of the federal interpleader legislation, that some United States
district judges might be influenced by narrow decisions in their own
state courts barring interpleader because of want of privity. Therefore,
it seemed desirable to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the
new Interpleader Act to insert an explicit provision negativing the ap-
plication of this doctrine. The extension of interpleader to new classes
of stakeholders should not be hampered by narrow limitations that
might prevent justice from being accomplished in many situations where
interpleader is badly needed.
Another narrow limitation abolished by the same clause of the 1936
Act is that of identity, which judges and text-writers often define by
saying that the claims must be identical or that all the claimants must
be claiming the same debt, duty or thing. In using such language,
courts are probably groping unsuccessfully toward the sound principle
that the claims must be mutually exclusive, i.e., if one claim is right-
the other must be wrong25 Nevertheless, the identity test as commonly
applied may cause an unjust refusal of interpleader where mutual ex-
clusiveness is present.57  Although the influence of the identity test on
52. New Jersey Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Rector, 76 N. J. Eq. 587, 75 Ad. 931
(ch., 1910); Manhattan Storage Co. v. Art Mluseum, 155 App. Div. 196, 139 N. Y. Supp.
1073 (1st Dep't. 1913). See CHA=, op. cit. supra note 48 at 62, n. 2.
53. 39 STrr. 541 (1916), 49 U.'S. C. A. § 97 (1926).
54. See Chafee, supra note 45 at 58-59.
55. Mlaxine Midland Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 56 F. (2d) 385, 387 (S. D. N. Y.
1932).
56. Chafee, supra note 1, 30 YnE L. J. 819-819.
57. Chafee, supra note 4s at 823-82S; CFHASE, supra note 1, 30 YLE L. J. 22-27.
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federal judges has been chiefly confined to dicta,"" a definite repudiation
of the test seemed desirable.
The provision of the 1936 Act abolishing privity and identity follows
closely the phraseology of the California Code of Civil Procedure, section
386, which was enacted in 1881 and has since been adopted in Idaho,
Montana, and tUtah. It appears to have worked very well in practice. 0
VENUE
The new statute says as to venue: "Such a suit may be brought in
the district court of the district in which one or more of such claimants
resides or reside." This liberalizes the venue provisions of the 1926
Act, which appeared at two points in that statute. In section 1, where
the prerequisites of federal interpleader were stated as necessary aver-
ments in the stakeholder's bill, the first averment specified was "that one
or more persons who are bona fide claimants .... resides or reside within
the territorial jurisdiction of said court." The words "bona fide" were
inserted by a Senator in committee, presumably to prevent an insurance
company from obtaining interpleader through a pretended claim.10 In-
asmuch as such a claim, if proved, would lead to the dismissal of the
bill under well-settled equitable principles, these words were unnecessary
and their meaning was obscure.0" They have therefore been omitted, but
the rest of the clause just quoted is substantially embodied in paragraph
(b) of the new statute. The second passage of the 1926 Act relating
to venue appeared in four long sentences at the beginning of section 2.
Inasmuch as that act and its predecessors related chiefly to interpleader
by life insurance companies, Congress was much concerned with the
problem whether suit ought to be brought at the residence of a beneficiary
or an assignee, and the 1917, 1925, and 1926 statutes all went into this
question in great detail. The courts had considerable difficulty in under-
standing these provisions and were inclined to disregard their detailed
requirements and allow interpleader to be brought in any district where
a claimant resided. 2 Since the Act of 1936 permits interpleader for all
58. Chafee, supra note 45 at 58.
59. In England, privity was abolished by somewhat similar language in a statute of
1860 and by a rule of court in 1883. Thus English interpleader has operated successfully
without the privity requirement for over seventy years. Attenborough v. London & St.
Katharine's Dock Co., L. R. 3 C. P. D. 450 (C. A. 1878); In re Mersey Docks and
Harbour Board, L. R. [18991 1 Q. B. 546 (C. A.). However, the English provisions differ
from the California Code in that they do not abolish the identity test. Sun. Ins. Office v,
Galinsky, [19141 2 K. B. 545 (C. A.).
60. See CONNELL, THE FEDERAL INTERPLEADER ACT (1920), op. cit. supra note 1 at p. 3.
61. The only reported case discussing "bona Jde" is Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Mason,
30 F. (2d) 715 (D. N. J. 1929), in which the court treated these words as superfluous.
62. Kansas City Life Insurance Co. v. Adamson, 24 F. (2d) 107 (N. D. Tex. 1928);
Bankers' Life Co. v. Ebbert, 48 F. (2d) 907 (IV. D. Pa. 1928). Stricter cases dealing with
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sorts of stakeholders, the former provisions relating to venue in suits
by insurance companies appeared to be unnecessary, and they were com-
pletely discarded in favor of the present simple venue clause, which
conforms to actual judicial practice under the preceding statute.03
The language of paragraph (b) is not unduly rigid. It says "suit may
be brought" and not "suits must be brought" in the district of a claim-
ant. This phraseology makes the paragraph a regulation of venue
rather than of jurisdiction. It was held in Commercial Casualty Insur-
ance Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co." that the general venue provision in
section 51 of the Judicial CodeP5 is a personal privilege of the defendant
which may be waived, so as to permit of suit in a district where neither
plaintiff nor defendant resides. Although this was not an interpleader
case, the same principle will probably allow the venue provisions of
paragraph (b) of the Interpleader Act of 1936 to be waived by the
agreement of the stakeholder and all the claimants, so as to permit
suit in the stakeholder's own district or in any other convenient district.
This point may prove important if a stakeholder makes a mistake and
files his bill in a district where a claimant has been personally served,
but later it turns out that the claimant is not domiciled there. Unless
one claimant objects to the venue at an early stage in the proceedings,
the narrower venue provisions of the 1917 Act were Penn. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Henderson, 244 Fed. 877 (N. D. Fla. 1917); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 253 Fed.
287 (S. D. Fla. 1918). For adverse criticisms of the former venue provisions see the
pamphlets by CoN-war.x, both op. cit. supra note 1.
63. The Hebert-Knutson bill, supra note 11, also allowed the stakeholder to sue in his
own district (1) if one or more of the claimants resided there, or (2) if one or more of
the claimants consented to this venue. The first alternative would mean that a Masacbu-
setts stakeholder could interplead a Massachusetts claimant and a Rhode Island claimant in
the Massachusetts district court. But paragraph (b) as enacted impliedly parmits ths,
because the Massachusetts claimant's residence confers a Massachusetts venue. It is true
that the cocitizenhip of the stakeholder and one claimant might prevent jurisdiction. This
question was discussed sura p. 973, 4. If this partial cocitizenship is a constitutional bar,
any attempt to deal with it in the statute would have been useless. On the other hand, if
there are no constitutional obstacles, it seems better to stick to the wording of the juriafic-
tional clause of the 1926 Act, which has proved so successful in operation (supra note3 7,
33) and leave questions of partial cocitizenship to be settled by judicial decisions.
The second alternative stated above would give the stakeholder a new privilege of inter-
pleading in his own district where no claimants reside, so long as one claimant con-ents to
the venue. This raises no constitutional problems, but there might be serious practical
objections. The stakeholder's residence, e.g., its place of incorporation if corporate, might
be very inconvenient to one claimant, and the other claimant might be induced to conment
by a collusion hard to prove. The stakeholder has a sufficiently wide range of choice by
being able to select the residence of any claimant. If all the claimants consent, the stake-
holder can sue in his own district, as the statutory venue would then be waivcd. But de-
termination of the controversy in the stakeholder's district should not be forced on an
unwilling claimant
64. 278 U. S. 177 (1929).
65. 36 STAT. 1101 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 112 (1926).
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venue will be waived, and the interpleader decree will be valid. On
the other hand, if the requirement of the district of suit in paragraph (b)
were phrased so as to be a jurisdictional requirement, it probably could
not be waived by the parties, and a mistake would be fatal to the validity
of the whole proceeding.
Two other phrases of paragraph (b) deserve attention. In the first
place, it may be objected that this paragraph will cause occasional in-
justice to the particular claimant who lives outside the district in which
the interpleader is brought. Suppose that one claimant resides in Massa-
chusetts and the other in California, and that interpleader is brought
in the Massachusetts district court, as the act of 1936 permits. It is
hard on the Californian to be forced to join in litigation in Massachusetts,
at the other end of the country. Ordinarily this is no objection to the
Massachusetts venue, because it would be equally hard on the Massa-
chusetts claimant to interplead in California. Furthermore, we can
reply that a similar possibility of hardship exists under the 1926 Act.
The partial attempt of Congress to meet such a situation in insurance
cases by trying to give a preferential venue to the beneficiary amounted
to practically nothing in the courts. An insurance company seemed
able under the 1926 Act to file its bill wherever any claimant resided, and
such a free choice was certainly possessed under the same act by surety
companies. In spite of these arguments in favor of the proposed phras-
ing of paragraph (b), the objectors may put their case a little differently
so as to make the hardship on the Californian still more evident, Let
us further suppose that the Massachusetts claimant is in the habit of
spending his winters in California. In that event it would not be difficult
for him to litigate in a California district, and Massachusetts becomes
clearly an- unsuitable venue although still permitted by the wording of
the statute. The objectors may urge that some express language should
have been inserted in the Act to take care of the situation, and to insure
that the interpleader bill must then be filed in the district of the Cali-
fornian claimant. The answer to this objection is, that the present
phrasing of paragraph (b) ("may be brought") does not oblige the
Massachusetts district court to entertain the suit, but leaves it free to
exercise its discretion to dismiss the bill and tell the stakeholder to start
suit in the more convenient forum in California. This point, that the
court having statutory jurisdiction may occasionally decline, in the
interests of justice, to exercise jurisdiction, is clearly brought out by
Mr. Justice Brandeis in Canada Malting Co., Ltd. v. Paterson Steam-
ships, Ltd."0 In sustaining the discretionary action of a district court,
which had dismissed admiralty libels within its statutory jurisdiction for
reasons of inconvenience, he said:
66. 285 U. S. 413, 422-423 (1932).
[Vol. 45
FEDERAL INTERPLEADER
"Obviously, the proposition that a court having jurisdiction must exercise
it, is not universally true ..... Courts of equity and of law also occasionally
decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise jurisdiction, where the suit
is between aliens or non-residents or where for kindred reasons the litiga-
tion can more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal."
Furthermore, it would have been unwise to attempt to regulate discretion
by an express provision. The judge's discretion will depend upon the
facts of each particular case, which make his forum more or less in-
convenient for the various claimants and the stakeholder. If this statute
tried to deal with the matter, it would only hamper the application of
the judge's common sense and his endeavor to do justice to all parties
concerned. The Act as worded leaves the district courts free to use their
discretionary powers to refuse relief and send the stakeholder to another
forum, whenever the facts make such a course just and convenient.
The second difficulty about paragraph (b) concerns the question,
where does a corporate claimant "reside"? Although the claimants
interpleaded by life insurance companies under the Interpleader Acts
have almost always been individuals, 7 fire insurance companies are
more likely to be subjected to claims by corporations,'s and after the
1926 Act allowed surety and casualty companies to interplead, corporate
claimants became more frequent.09 They will be much commoner in
suits under the new Act, which extends relief to many kinds of business
controversies. Therefore, it becomes necessary to consider the meaning
of "resides or reside" as applied to corporate claimants. It seems clear
that a corporation "resides" in the district covering the state of its in-
corporation; or, if this state includes two or more districts, then in the
district where the head office of the corporation is situated. This con-
clusion naturally follows from the judicial construction of the similar
language of section 51 of the Judicial Code,"0 dealing with venue in
general. That section says that where jurisdiction is founded on diversity
of citizenship, "suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence
of either the plaintiff or the defendant." Although this section, like the
jurisdiction and venue provisions of the 1936 Act, makes no express
.mention of corporations, "residence" in the case of corporations has
been repeatedly construed to refer to the district in the state of incorp-
oration where the head office is situated. 1 A similar result was reached
67. The only exception noted is Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lu.t , 46 F. (2d)
505 (W. D. La. 1930).
6S. Examples under the Interpleader Acts are Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Co., 292 U.
S. 190 (1934); Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Brown, 52 F. (2d) 164 (W. D. La.
1931).
69. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Reid, 16 F. (2d) 502 (E. D. Pa. 1926); American Surety
Co. v. Calcasieu Oil Co., Inc., 58 F. (2d) 1039 (W. D. La. 1932).
70. 36 STAT. 1101 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 112 (1926).
71. See the annotations in 28 U. S. C. A. § 112 (1926) on pp. 68-78; Dome, FEnAL
PaocFamzE, (1928) 482-3. See also cases cited infra notes 73 and 74.
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without discussion under the 1926 Interpleader Act in two suits where
a surety company interpleaded a corporate claimant in the district in the
state of incorporation where the head office was situated. 2  These cases
under the 1926 Act and the judicial construction of section 51 of the
Judicial Code make it plain that the new interpleader statute will operate
smoothly when one or more claimants are corporations. Some persons
may wish to permit an interpleader bill to be filed against a corporate
claimant in the district where it has its principal place of business, al-
though this is outside the state of incorporation; or even to allow suit
in any district in which a corporate claimant does business. But in order
to accomplish either of these purposes, a clause would have had to be
added to paragraph (b) creating special 'regulations of venue with
respect to corporate claimants. This would have complicated the bill
and would have been entirely inconsistent with the well-settled rule under
section 51 of the Judicial Code, that for purposes of suits based on
diversity of citizenship a corporation with its place of incorporation and
legal office in one district does not "reside" in a district in another state
by doing business there, however great the volume and importance of
that business." It does not even "reside" in another district in the
same state. 4  Paragraph (b) as enacted has the advantage of simplicity
and of following the venue scheme of both the 1926 Act (as judicially
interpreted) and of federal litigation in general.
POWERS OF THE COURT
In the 1926 Act, the subject-matter of paragraphs (b) and (c) is con.
tained in one paragraph as section 2. It seemed better drafting to hav
two separate paragraphs in the new statute, paragraph (b) dealing with
venue and (c) with the powers of the court. Paragraph (c) follows
the corresponding portion of section 2 of the 1926 Act. There are only
two changes. First, the new statute allows an injunction in the inter-
pleader proceeding against a suit "in any United States court," whereas
the 1926 Act said "in any other Federal court." The revised wording
uses the proper technical description of the United States courts. The
72. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Reid and American Surety Co. v. Calcasieu Oil Co.,
both cited supra note 69. Although the insurance cases cited in notes 67 and 68 involved
corporate claimants, the "residence" of such a claimant does not appear to have determined
the venue.
73. Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444 (1892); Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton,
146 U. S. 202 (1892); In re Keasbey and Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221, 228-9 (1895),
quoted with approval in Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Rr. Co., 215 U. S.
501, 508-10 (1910); Camp v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308 (1919); Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v.
Chicago, Rock Island & P. Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 363 (1926); DoBE, FEDEaA, PROcEDURE, (1928)
483.
74. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 496 (1893).
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omission of "other" allows the injunction to forbid further suits in the
same court in which the interpleader is filed. Probably under the 1926
Act the district court would issue a stay against any suits in the same
court conflicting with the interpleader, but it seemed desirable for the
new statute to permit the injunction to be sufficiently wide to take care
of the matter without the necessity of a stay. Both the old and new
statutes allow injunctions against threatened or pending suits in state
courts.75 Secondly, in the provision as to enjoinable suits, "on such
instrument or obligation" takes the place of "on such policy or certificate
of membership" in the 1926 Act. This change carries out the purpose
of the new statute in widening the types of obligations with respect to
which interpleader is permitted.
HEAPaNG AND FnAL DECREE
This paragraph conforms exactly to section 3 of the 1926 Act, which
has worked well in practice.
The insertion of an express provision about costs and counsel fees
was suggested by one of the United States district judges, but after care-
ful consideration this suggestion was not adopted. The new statute says
nothing about costs and counsel fees, because the judicial construction
of the 1926 Act shows that the present wording takes care of the matter
satisfactorily without any express provision. Under the non-statutory
Chancery practice and under interpleader statutes in most jurisdictions, 0
the stakeholder is entitled to obtain his costs and counsel fees from the
fund deposited in court, since he is a neutral person who has been in-
volved in the quarrel between the claimants without any fault of his
own. This privilege has been frequently recognized in federal inter-
pleader suits not brought under the interpleader legislation.77 The
peculiar wording of the Interpleader Act of 1917 created a good deal
of difficulty about this matter, because it expressly allowed the stake-
holder only his actual court costs, which did not include counsel fees.7 s
75. The acts of 1917 and 1925 dia not authorize this, and § 265 of the JrDCLI. CONE,
36 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 379 (1926), was held to prevent an injunction
against a pending state suit. See Chafee, supra note 45 at 41-45.
76. A contrary view prevails in a few states. The authorities are collected in (1933)
17 ,-I--. L. Rnv. 449; (1929) 39 YA LI. J. 286.
77. McNamara v. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society, 114 Fed. 910 (C. C. A.
5th, 1902) ; Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Clark, 16 Fed. 20 (C. C. E. D. La. 188,3) ; Penn
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Union Trust Co., 83 Fed. 891 (N. D. Cal. 1897); Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Lane, 151 .Fed. 276 (E. D. Ga. 1907), aff'd by memorandum 157
Fed. 1002 (C. C. A. 5th, 19S); Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Farmers' & Mechanics'
National Bank, 173 Fed. 390 (S. D. Oh. 1909); Caten v. Eagle Building & Loan Aa-n.,
177 Fed. 996 (W. D. Pa. 1909); Thomas Kay Woolen Mll Co. v. Sprague, 259 Fed. 338
(D. Ore. 1919).
73. See Guardian Life Insurance Co. v. Rosenbaum, 280 Fed. 861 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922);
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Bidoggia, 15 F. (2d) 126, 17 F. (2d) 112 (D. Idaho 1926).
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The omission of this express provision about costs in the 1925 and 1926
Acts, coupled with the authorization of suitable and proper orders and
decrees, left the courts free to follow the usual equitable practice and
allow counsel fees, as they have done in several subsequent decisions.19
Because of this abundant judicial construction of the previous law, it
seems certain that the statutory language continued in the act of 1936
will take care of costs and counsel fees for the stakeholder in a very
satisfactory manner. The courts will normally allow them, but will have
discretion to deny either or both when the stakeholder cannot fairly
claim such a privilege.80
INTERPLEADER ALLOWED DEFENSIVELY IN ACTIONS AT LAW8 '
Although paragraph (e) of the 1936 act does not correspond to any-
thing in the three previous Interpleader Acts, the convenient procedure
herein authorized of interpleader by way of equitable defense in an ac-
tion at law82 was used by many federal courts under section 274b of the
Judicial Code,83 and seemingly authorized by the United States Supreme
79. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bondurant, 27 F. (2d) 464 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928); Allen
v. Hudson, 35 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Morris, 61 F.
(2d) 104 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); (1933) 17 MINN. L. Rav. 449; Terry v. Supreme Forest, 21 V.
(2d) 158 (D. Tenn. 1926); Ackerman v. Tobin, 22 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Globe &
Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Brown, 52 F. (2d) 164 (W. D. La. 1931); Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Dunne, 2 F. Supp. 165 (S. D. N. Y. 1931); American Surety Co. v.
Calcasieu Oil Co., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 200 (IV. D. La. 1932).
The only case since the 1926 Act denying the power to give counsel fees was Continental
Life Insurance Co. v. Sailor, 47 F. (2d) 911 (S. D. Cal. 1930), which does not mention the
1926 Act and which was influenced by the special practice of the California state courts
with regard to counsel fees. This decision in the California district seems impliedly over-
ruled by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Morris, supra, which reversed the dis-
trict court for the southern district of California and held that the stakeholder was en-
titled to a reasonable attorney's fee.
80. Cases not under the interpleader legislation have denied costs and counsel fees to
an interested stakeholder who was allowed to file a bill in the nature of interpleader.
Groves v. Sentell, 153 U. S. 465, 486 (1894).
81. See Chafee, supra note -5 at 45-52.
82. Defensive interpleader is authorized by statute in a large number of states, be-
ginning with the Naw YORIC CODE Or CIvML PaOCEDURE in 1851 (now N. Y. Civi. PRAC1G1i
Acr, § 287). The same procedure is expresly permitted by § 17 of the Uriroam BILLS ol
LADING Acr, 39 STAT. 541 (1916), 49 U. S. C. A. § 97 (1926).
83. 38 STAr. 956 (1915), 28 U. S. C. A. § 398 (1926). The cases allowing a defendant at
law to interplead under this section are as follows:
First Circuit: Pearson v. Holden, 58 F. (2d) 1050 (D. Mass. 1932). Fourth Circuit: see
United States ex rel. Morris v. Richardson, 233 Fed. 1610 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915), cited In
Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon, 260 U. S. 235 at 242. Fifth Circuit: Duell v. Greiner, 15 F,
(2d) 726 (S. D. Fla. 1926). Sixth Circuit: Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co. v. Louis-
ville Public Warehouse Co., 19 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927). Seventh Circuit; }Ilntz
v. Hintz, 78 F. (2d) 432 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935). Eighth Circuit: Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon,
271 Fed. 928 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921), modified in 260 U. S. 235 (1922). Tenth Circuit: Brown
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Court in Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nationdl Bank. 4 However, the Sec-
ond Circuit took a different view, and would not allow a stakeholder to ob-
tain interpleader defensively.Y5 The new statute offered an excellent op-
portunity to make it certain that a defendant can interplead at law when-
ever he would also be entitled to interplead by a bill in equity.
The following example will illustrate the desirable operation of para-
graph (e). A Connecticut life insurance company is sued at law in the
United States District Court in Connecticut by a New York woman, who
claims to be the sole beneficiary under a matured policy. A Massa-
chusetts woman also claims to be the sole beneficiary and threatens to
sue the company in a Massachusetts state court. The company could
file an original bill of interpleader in equity in a United States district
court in New York or Massachusetts (at the residence of either claimant)
and have the Connecticut action at law enjoined. But under paragraph
(e) the company can take the simpler course of filing an equitable defense
in the Connecticut federal action at law, asking that the plaintiff therein
(the New York claimant) shall interplead with the Massachusetts claim-
ant as to the amount of the policy, which the company therewith pays
into the Connecticut federal court. This court will thereupon issue pro-
cess against the Massachusetts claimant ordering her to appear in the
same action, and the writ can be served upon her in Massachusetts under
paragraph (c), which also allows her to be enjoined from prosecuting her
claim elsewhere. Thus, instead of having to go to New York or Mass-
achusetts and start a new federal suit there, the company can have every-
thing settled in the existing Connecticut suit.
In addition, if a stakeholder who is a defendant in an action at law
in a United States district court would be allowed to file an ancillary bill
of interpleader (or in the nature of a bill of interpleader) in that court
against the law plaintiff and against other claimants who were not origin-
ally joined in the action at law, paragraph (e) of the new Act lets the
defendant stakeholder obtain the same relief by the simpler method of an
equitable defense. This is possible even if he could not have filed an
original bill in equity against these claimants under the provisions of
paragraph (a) of the Act of 1936. For example, a New York life insur-
ance company is sued in a New York district court by P, a citizen of
v. Home Life Insurance Co., 3 F. (2d) 661 (E. D. Okla. 1925). No cases have been found
in the Third and Ninth Circuits. The Second Circuit is opposed; see note 85.
84. 260 U. S. 235 (1923). The defendant had interpleaded under § 274b in a federal
action at law, and the main holding was that this defensive interpleader proceeding must
be tried on the equity side of the court and in accordance with equitable principlLs No
suggestion was made by Chief Justice Taft that interpleader is impossible under § 274b.
85. Marine Mlidland Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 56 F. (2d) 35 (S. D. N. Y. 1932),




Virginia who professes to be a beneficiary under the policy. X, another
Virginian, is an adverse beneficiary claimant and threatens suit. The
insurance company cannot file a bill of interpleader against the two
claimants under the 1926 act or under paragraph (a) of the new statute
because the two claimants are both Virginians and not citizens of differ-
ent states. However, the insurance company would, independently of
federal interpleader legislatiofi, be allowed by decisions in the Second
Circuit (and perhaps elsewhere) 8" to file an ancillary bill of interpleader
in connection with the pending federal lawsuit if the company could
overcome the difficulty of getting service in the New York district upon
X, a Virginian.87 In circuits which entertain such ancillary bills, para-
graph (e) will allow the insurance company to interplead P and X by
its answer in the lawsuit in the New York district, and under paragraph
(c) the process of the district can be served on the Virginian claimant, X,
at his Virginia residence so as to give the New York district court juris-
diction over claimant X as well as over P. The proceedings in the inter-
pleader will be on the equity side of the district court of New York, as
required in Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank."'
[To be Continued]
86. Sherman National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 247 Fed. 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917),
aff'g 238 Fed. 225 (S. D. N. Y. 1916); Irving Trust Co. v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 47
F. (2d) 907 (S. D. N. Y. 1931). See also Stone v. Bishop, 23 Fed. Cas. no. 1,312, p. 134
(D. Mass. 1878); Union Insurance Co. v. Glover, 9 Fed. 529 (C. C. Me. 1881); Louisiana
State Lottery Co. v. Clark, 16 Fed. 20 (C. C. La. 1883); Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Miner, 25
Fed. 533 (C. C. Cal. 1885); Hirschmann v. Bank of Dassel, 21 F. (2d) 263 (C. C. A. 8th,
1927); Fleming v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 40 F. (2d) 38 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930), certiorari
denied, 282 U. S. 869 (1930). None of these cases was under the Interpleader Acts. See
also Chafee, supra note 4 at 1145-1160.
87. See the second installment of this atticle in the May, 1936 issue of the YALS LAW
JouRNAL for the reply to the objection that the Interpleader Act of 1936 Is exhaustive and
does not allow any federal interpleader suits to be maintained except under the jurisdictional
conditions specified in paragraph (a)(i) of the statute. This objection interprets the
statute as abolishing ancillary bills where all the claimants are cocitizens, but such an inter.
pretation seems unsound.
88. 260 U. S. 235 (1923).
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